Abstract

Of
The Total Force: How can the CINC Utilize the Reserve Tactical Air
Component?
In the aftermath of September 11 th , 2001, the challenges faced by the operational commander are growing rapidly. The last decade was a time of post cold war force and budget reductions that have impacted the active and reserve components of U.S. forces.
The operational commander has to balance force employment to meet the needs of the continued war on terrorism, and the infrastructure and demand associated with
Homeland defense and the continuously changing terrorist threat. He is pressured to meet all the requirements of current operations, forward presence, and homeland security, and do so with zero friendly casualties while enduring target selection by political micromanagement and ever shrinking resources.
To meet these challenges, the operational commander must broaden the scope of planning considerations to entertain the combat power resident in reserve tactical air units in consideration of mass, economy of force, simultaneity and depth. This is not a force structure issue; it is an operational commander issue. This untapped resource has tremendous potential for impact at the operational level, but it must make it to the operation commander's "tool kit". It is a crime that active component tactical air units suffer extreme OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO, negative impact to readiness and retention, and limitations to use at the operation level of war, while three F/A-18 squadrons wait in reserve, remnants of an old "force-in-waiting" system, unutilized by the new system.
TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction
In an uncertain time of evolving threats, new and varied missions and Government reaction to the horrific events of September 11 th , 2001, the challenges faced by the operational commander are impressive. Through analysis of current National Military Strategy and Total Force policy, recent historical operational experience, and the guiding principles of operational art, this paper will show that the operational commander has an unutilized tool available to him that can contribute to mass, economy of force, simultaneity and depth. This is not a force structure issue. It is an operational issue.
The Operational Commander's Dilemma
The continued war on terrorism, coupled with the ever growing infrastructure and demand associated with Homeland defense and the new awareness of the continuously changing terrorist threat, begets an analysis of the operational commander's dilemma: Meet all the requirements of current operations, forward presence, and homeland security, and do so with zero friendly casualties while enduring the gauntlet of target selection by political micromanagement and ever shrinking resources. "Over the next several years, we will face a series of challenges: a range of smaller-scale contingency operations; the threat of large-scale, cross-border aggression; the continued proliferation of advanced technologies; and a variety of transnational dangers. We also will confront increasingly sophisticated asymmetric challenges involving the use of chemical, biological, and possibly nuclear weapons; attacks against the information systems of our forces and national infrastructure; terrorism, as well as any number of the "wild card" scenarios. As we move into the next decade, we also face the likely prospect of different and possibly more challenging regional threats, a still more demanding range of asymmetric challenges, and the very real potential for threats to the U.S. homeland. Finally, beyond the 2010-2015 period, there is the possibility that a regional great power or a global peer competitor may emerge." 1 What tools belong to the Operational commander that can be used, or used more effectively, to help solve these gargantuan challenges? How can current Department of Defense resources that remain unutilized or underutilized make substantial contributions to current operations, forward presence, and homeland security?
An analysis of operations in Iraq, Kosovo and Afghanistan shows preponderance and a voracious, insatiable appetite for air power. The combination of precision weapons employment, diverse employment options, relatively low risk to U.S. forces, and reduced risk of collateral damage, has made this form of combat power the method of choice for the combatant Commander-in-Chief (CINC) and the politician. Air power is the instrument for preparation of the battle space, and in some cases, the only form of combat power employed, as in the case of Operation Allied Force.
The Total Force Concept
In contrast with the ever increasing demand for air power, the supply has there were a lot of air forces that did not help me, because they could not drop precision, they could not fly at night and they could not fight in all kinds of weather". To further differentiate, one must understand the differences in reserve tactical unit employment in the Total Force between the services, and the impact this has on the potential combat power available to the operational commander. In 1994, after a rapid deployment by the Air Force in support of Operation Vigilant Warrior, the Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) concept was born. 7 This concept has facilitated the seamless integration of Air force reserve and Air National Guard tactical air units into the Total Force. By scheduling AEFs for 90 day periods of duty on 15 months cycles, reserve forces can be scheduled into the force utilization plan like any active component force.
They are not a "force-in-waiting", but a seamlessly integrated unit in the Total Force.
Therefore, no plausible utilization change for these units exists currently that significantly impacts the dilemma faced by the operational commander, since they are being utilized as part of his "tool kit" already. 
Case Studies in the Operational Commander's Dilemma
History provides an excellent window to view the intricacies of the operational commander's dilemma and the challenges that were overcome through extreme operating tempo (OPTEMPO) and personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO). Consistent in each of the operations below are the impact that air power has had on the battle space, and that current operational doctrine is straining our active component forces.
Operation Desert Storm
The operational commander's use of air power in Desert Storm to achieve operational level goals was dramatically successful. The opening round of Desert Storm was the largest air offensive since World War II. 9 The coalition tactical air units simultaneously hit virtually every target category in the master attack plan on the first night. 10 Sortie rates were extremely high, and remained virtually unchanged for the entire operation. 11 This, however, was not a come-as-you-are war. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) had five and a half months to plan, build up, and train in theater. It is misleading to expect the same sets of circumstances and to conclude that such a display of airpower should be expected in the future. 12 In general terms, the operational commander has to be able to generate the same type of air power mass and simultaneity in come-as-you-are scenarios as was generated for Desert Storm, but conditions enjoyed during Desert Storm may not exist. The commander must then find alternative sources for air power augmentation. These sources must have the capability to integrate quickly and seamlessly. The combat power of the Navy Reserve and Marine Corps Reserve tactical air units fits this requirement with respect to hardware capabilities, and air crew training and readiness.
Operation Allied Force
In terms of operational employment, Allied Force was a military success. 13 NATO generated 78 days of continuous, around-the-clock operations, flew 38,000 sorties with only 2 aircraft loses, and suffered no combat fatalities. 14 On the surface that would seem contradictory to the argument here, but General John Jumper said, "The Kosovo operation drained us. It took everything we had. I'm not sure we could have done much more than we did. We were stressed about as much as I think we could be stressed, and it's going to take fully six months to get back to the readiness levels we need." 
Analysis of the Reserve Tactical Air Component at the Operational Level
To explore the use of the combat power of the reserve component tactical air units as a tool for the operational commander, an analysis of Operational Art is offered.
First, an analysis on the macro level, with further investigation into two principles of war; the principle of mass and the principle of economy of force, and the concepts of simultaneity and depth. "The overarching operational concept in JP 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, is that JFC's integrate and synchronize the actions of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces to achieve strategic and operational objectives through integrated, joint campaigns and major operations." 17 While the above passage refers to integration and synchronization of major force components, integration of the reserve tactical air units is substantial enough in combat power to impact the actions of the air component, thereby impacting the integration as a whole. The operational commander has failed to integrate a small but powerful segment of his forces.
Operational art requires commanders to answer the following questions:
1. "What military (or related political and social) conditions must be produced in the operational area to achieve the strategic goal? (Ends)" 18 2. "What sequence of actions is most likely to produce that condition?
(Ways)" 
The Principle of Mass
According to the Doctrine for Joint Operations, "The purpose of mass is to concentrate the effects of combat power at the most advantageous place and time to achieve decisive results. To achieve mass is to synchronize and/or integrate appropriate joint force capabilities where they will have a decisive effect in a short period of time.
Mass often must be sustained to have the desired effect. Massing effects, rather than concentrating forces, can enable even numerically inferior forces to achieve decisive results and minimize human losses and waste of resources." 23 To concentrate combat power and integrate capabilities, operational commanders have turned to air power with precision weapons. Massing effects often means precision strikes of target sets through out the theater to simultaneously achieve a desired effect. The addition of combat power in the precision strike area increases the number of targets that can be simultaneously attacked, and the length of time that level of action can be sustained. By including Navy and Marine Corps Reserve tactical air units at the operational level, mass is achieved by increasing the capability to mass effects and sustain operations.
The Principle of Economy of Force
According to the Doctrine for Joint Operations, "The purpose of economy of force is to allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts. Economy of force is the judicious employment and distribution of forces. It is the measured allocation of available combat power to such tasks as limited attacks, defense, delays, deception, or even retrograde operations to achieve mass elsewhere at the decisive point and time." 24 The use of combat power to achieve secondary efforts is an area particularly suited to the reserve units. Since the Navy reserve units have not been used in combat in over 10 years, it is fair to say that they are not considered by the operational commander in planning. Therefore they can be allocated to secondary efforts without net reduction in active component forces available. Once again, since precision strike, air superiority and suppression of enemy air defenses are all capabilities inherent to the reserve F/A-18 squadron; they are a versatile, capable asset to use in limited attacks, defense, deception, and retrograde operations.
Simultaneity and Depth
"The concepts of simultaneity and depth are foundations of joint operational theory. The goal is to overwhelm and cripple adversary capabilities and adversary will to resist. The goal of simultaneity in joint force operations contributes directly to an adversary's collapse by placing more demands on adversary forces and functions than can be handled. The concept of depth seeks to overwhelm the adversary throughout the AOR and/or JOA from multiple dimensions, contributing to its speedy defeat or capitulation." 25 The ability of a joint operation to produce simultaneity and depth during a phase or operation predominated by air power is directly related to the amount of sorties that can be flown by aircraft that are suitable. These aircraft need to be capable of contributing to the battle for air superiority, deliver precision weapons, and operate from varied locations and attack from multiple directions. Since F/A-18 squadrons can operate from land or sea, and are extremely capable in multiple missions, they are a rich resource for achieving simultaneity and depth.
The Reserve Tactical Air Components Contribution to Solving the Operational Commander's Dilemma
The naval strategy outlined "…calls for the integration of the Active and
Reserve components into a seamless and cohesive Total Force capable of meeting all requirements in peacetime and in war." 26 The Navy Total Force Policy states that, "During peacetime, Navy will employ Reserve forces and personnel to relieve stress on Active operating Tempo (OPTEMPO) and Personnel Tempo (PERSTEMPO) by deploying, when practicable, and by fulfilling close-to-home Commander in Chief (CINC) requirements that enable the deployment of Active forces and personnel." 27 Recall the operational commander's dilemma: Meet all the requirements of current operations, forward presence, and homeland security, and do so with zero friendly casualties while enduring the gauntlet of target selection by political micromanagement and ever shrinking resources.
Each area of the dilemma can be addressed in some fashion by employment of reserve tactical air units. Current operations can better embody the tenants of operation art with more precision strike, air superiority, and SEAD platforms. More combat power is available in those areas so endurance to lengthy target selection will improve.
The flexibility and sustainability achieved will lessen the negative impact to operational Force when necessary. In our traditional mantras of "do more with less" and "make it happen", we relegate ourselves to an OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO that is not required if we allow paradigms to be broken. 
Conclusion
